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The Commission is specifically considering ‘how ideas of Britishness may be more 
inclusive of a wider range of religions and beliefs’. It is good that the focus of is on 
‘ideas’ (plural) of Britishness.  An underlying assumption of the exercise seems to be that 
‘Britishness’ is susceptible to expression as identifiable concepts which provide a 
framework for a harmonious society.  However, this assumption should be treated with 
some caution. In the UK common ground is certainly needed, with key values including 
equality and the rule of law: but these are universal values and are not peculiar either to 
Britain or to the United Kingdom as a whole and to imply that they are may estrange 
some members of minority communities.  Thought should be given as to how values such 
as these may be conveyed alike to religious majorities and minorities. Also, Cardiff 
research has indicated that there are more similarities than differences in State approaches 
to religion across the countries of Europe which may be articulated as principles of law 
on religion – values such as equality and the rule of law are implicit in these principles.2  
Another avenue worth exploration would be the incidence of these values in religious 






1. To what extent, and in what ways, have recent legislative changes been beneficial 
or detrimental? In what ways, if any, do they or other existing laws need to be 
modified? 
Clarity is needed as to precisely what ‘recent legislative changes’ includes and what 
criteria are to be used to determine what is ‘beneficial’ and ‘detrimental’.  For current 
purposes, we have limited our enquiry to legislation enacted since the Human Rights Act 
1998 and areas of concern that have arisen either in the case-law or in Cardiff research.  
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Research conducted at the Centre for Law and Religion at Cardiff University has 
indicated how the law affecting religion in England and Wales has changed dramatically 
over the last fifteen years.
4
  It has been suggested that it is now possible to talk of a 
category of ‘religion law’ similar to ‘employment law’ or ‘family law’.5  The growth of 
litigation during this period is documented by the Law and Religion Scholars Network 
(LARSN) Case Database, set up and maintained by the Centre.
6
   It has also been 
suggested that this, together with an increase in legislation and a growing understanding 
of religious rights (under civil law), has led to the ‘juridification of religion’.7  However, 
caution is also required. Cardiff research has also shown that English and Welsh law on 
religion bodies shares similar principles to those of other European States.
8
  Moreover, 
the importance of the historical context of the law should not be forgotten, especially in 
England where there remains a church established by law.
9
  The interplay between the 
‘new’ laws and older statutes has been described as a key ‘pressure point’.10 Another 
avenue to explore, thus, is the continuing influence of older law as it may still shape the 
British approach to religion and belief in society. 
The major legislative changes have taken place in the areas of human rights, 
discrimination law, charity law, criminal law, education law and family law:  
With respect to human rights law, the Human Rights Act 1998 has resulted in confusion 
as to the extent to which churches will be public authorities and thus subject to the Act.
11
 
Moreover, the UK judiciary has generally favoured a narrow interpretation of religious 
rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, employing a number of filtering 
devices such as the manifestation/motivation distinction and the specific situation rule.
12
 
Cardiff research has suggested that the application of these filtering devices has led to 
perceptions that religious rights are not being taken seriously by domestic courts.
13
 While 
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we welcome the recent judgment of the Strasbourg Court which has clarified the 
application of these devices and should lessen their use,
14
 it remains to be seen whether 
the domestic judiciary will follow the example taken by this international court.  
With respect to discrimination law, a number of areas of confusion continue to exist with 
respect of the new laws on religious discrimination not least how they interact with the 
protections afforded under human rights law.
15
 There is also confusion as to the definition 
of religion or belief,
16
 the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination,
17
 and the 
reach of exceptions afforded to religious groups.
18
 There are circumstances where certain 
groups feel that they are themselves being discriminated against by the general structure 
of the law. This is particularly so where the legislation represents a shift in social mores 
that challenges traditional beliefs, notably as to sexual morality and the social functions 
of men and women.  
In relation to charity law, concerns exist as to the role and function of the Charity 
Commission, the application of the ‘public benefit’ test and the definition of religion 
following the recent liberalisation of the definition in relation to registration law.
19
 
In relation to criminal law, there are concerns surrounding the abolition of the offence of 
blasphemy and its partial replacement with a number of new criminal offences 
concerning religion the ambit of which remains largely unknown and unenforceable.
20
 
In the field of education, concern focuses around the compatibility of the law against 
human rights standards in terms of religious freedom, the role and function of SACREs 
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and the legal framework relating to schools which have a religious character (which are 
commonly but erroneously referred to as ‘faith schools’), especially as to admissions.21 
As to family law, the main issues relate to the religious upbringing of children, the law 
relating to marriage and divorce, and the operation of religious courts and tribunals.
22
  In 
respect of the particularly contentious area of same-sex relations, the UK and Scottish 
governments (though not the Northern Ireland Executive) seem to have made reasonable 
provision for the sensibilities of those opposed on religious grounds to same-sex 
marriage.
23
 However, the decision by the Westminster Government to retain civil 
partnership only for same-sex couples, whilst making marriage available to such couples, 
would seem to be an anomaly and may be considered an example of unequal treatment 
based on sexual orientation, even though the decision would appear to be within the 
Government’s margin of appreciation under Article 8 of the ECHR.24  The impression is 
left that the proper interest of the state in the institution of marriage is unclear. 
The respective rights of parents and children as to religious belief, particularly the rights 
of children themselves to hold beliefs of their own, do not seem to have been properly 
addressed. They require further consideration. There is an issue here about the age at 
which a child may choose his or her religion (see C (A Child), Re [2012]
 25
: the child aged 
ten, was allowed to be baptised against the objections of her (non-practising) Jewish 
mother). The issue of ‘Gillick competence’26 appears relevant here. 
2. What is the appropriate relationship between minority religious tribunals, for 
example Sharia and Beth Din courts, and mainstream legal systems?  
From 2010 to 2011, the AHRC/ESRC Religion and Society Programme funded a 
multidisciplinary project at Cardiff University to study religious courts and tribunals 
across the UK. The project, ‘Social Cohesion and Civil Law: Marriage, Divorce and 
Religious Courts’, explored how religious law already functioned alongside civil law in 
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the area of marriage and divorce.
27
  It examined the workings of three religious tribunals 
in detail: a Jewish Beth Din (London); a matrimonial tribunal of the Roman Catholic 
Church (Cardiff); and a Muslim ‘Sharia Council’ (Birmingham)). The project asked 
‘What is the legal status of these courts?’ and ‘How do they operate in relation to 
marriage, divorce and remarriage?’ The researchers conducted interviews with staff at the 
courts, complemented by workshops, observation, and analysis of statistics. Contrary to 
some popular and media concerns, they found that none of these courts seeks to compete 
with or undermine the civil law and they provide a valuable service for their adherents.  
None of the tribunals studied had a ‘legal status’ in the sense of ‘recognition’ by the State 
or its law. They derived their authority from their religious affiliation, not from the State, 
and that authority extended only to those who choose to submit to them. There is no 
‘hierarchy’ of tribunals within the Jewish and Muslim communities, and no appeal 
structure. This has led to an element of ‘forum shopping’ by litigants. 
However, as far as marriage/divorce is concerned, they were not ‘arbitrators’.  Their 
authority to rule on the validity/termination of a marriage did not derive from the parties’ 
agreement to submit their ‘dispute’ to them (indeed, there may be no dispute) in the same 
way as an arbitration clause in a contract (for which the Beth Din and some Sharia 
tribunals would also qualify to rule on civil disputes). Rather, adherents to the particular 
faith must make use of the religious tribunal if they are to obtain sanction to remarry 
within their faith.  For adherents, being able to remarry religiously serves both to enable 
them to remain within their faith community and to regularise their position with the 
religious authorities. This is particularly crucial in the Jewish religion, because the failure 
to obtain a get will jeopardise the legitimate status of the parties’ future children and 
descendants.  
The Cardiff research highlighted the problem whereby religious marriages are not 
registered and consequently the parties are not married in the eyes of the State. This 
means that should the (religious) marriage get into difficulties then those parties have 
little redress under civil law. Rather than being able to use both the courts of the State and 
the tribunals of the group, such people can only have recourse to the tribunals of the 
group. Our research suggests that this is a real problem in the Muslim community.  The 
Sharia Council we studied deals with a significant number (over half in the 27 cases that 
we observed) of litigants who do not have a marriage recognised under English law. 
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Cardiff research has called for an increase in education and a development of public 
debate concerning Sharia.
28
 It has also indicated that the existence of religious law and 
religious courts and tribunals is not only an issue for Islam.
29
 Cardiff researchers have 
also recommended a draft Bill to deal with the issue of consent in religious tribunals.
30
 
Question 2 also raises wider issues about the position and autonomy of religious 
organisations in the UK, and their internal norms, under the civil law of the State.  The 
traditional view as to the status of religious organisations under the general law is that 
they are private contractual associations whose rules resemble those of a private club. 
However, major religions have complex laws that cover many aspects of life for their 
members, often with their own adjudicative systems. Provided it is clear that they are 
subject to the national courts, religious tribunals may be socially useful for voluntary 
arbitration of disputes (under the Arbitration Act 1996 and the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 




There are also issues which relate to the administration of some Christian tribunals.  The 
disciplinary tribunals and the courts of the Church of England that deal with faculties for 
church buildings and their contents are integrated into the general legal system, but the 
position of the Church of Scotland is less clear.
32
 In Scotland, the decisions of tribunals 
generally are reviewable by the secular courts where a patrimonial interest is involved 
even when there is no public law element in the decision.
33
  This means that, save the 
Church of Scotland, secular courts in Scotland review decisions of religious tribunals.
34
 
3. What have been the benefits of anti-terrorism legislation and preventative action? 
Have there been negative effects, and if so how could these be minimised or 
removed? 
If anti-terrorism legislation is necessary (and the political consensus supports that view) 
then it must be non-discriminatory as between religious groups or it will be in breach of 
the ECHR. It is not clear what is meant by ‘anti-terrorism legislation’. Part of the wider 
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picture is increasingly strict controls on immigration and, in particular, the special 
arrangements for non-EEA ministers of religion. There have certainly been negative 
effects from the latter: e.g., the Methodist Church no longer uses probationary ministers 
from outside the EEA (mainly from the US) on two-year attachments because, not having 
yet been ordained, they cannot easily qualify for a Tier 5 (Temporary Worker - Religious 
Worker) visa. 
 
The problem, as least in part, is that the Churches see themselves as part of or associated 
with universal institutions or international ecclesial communities and alliances – a 
Methodist minister in the Gambia is just as much a Methodist minister as one in Luton – 
but successive Governments have wanted to restrict non-EEA immigration and, in doing 
so, they have had popular support. There are special arrangements for visas for clergy and 
religious workers but it is not clear that they always work satisfactorily. In particular, 
innocent exchanges, particularly between Christian churches and including short visits 
for study or conferences, seem in practice to be frequently oppressive.  
 
A specific issue here is that the language qualification for a Tier 2 visa for a cleric (at 
least CEFR level B2 in reading, writing, speaking and listening) is higher than that for a 
general Tier 2 visa (at least CEFR level B1) for ‘a skilled job’ such as thoracic surgery. 
The principal need of (e.g.) an Ethiopian Orthodox congregation is for a priest who can 
speak Amharic and celebrate the liturgy in Ge’ez: not that he can speak fluent English. 
 
4. What are the overlaps, similarities and differences between racial discrimination 
and discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, and are these adequately 
reflected in the current legal framework? 
In some cases there is a substantial overlap between discrimination on the grounds of 
religion and race. Judaism and Sikhism, in particular, are racially related. Case law 
recognised this in the case of Judaism and Sikhism before religious discrimination was 
controlled, by treating discrimination against Jews and Sikhs as racial.  This leads to 





sometimes to their detriment (e.g. JFS
37
). 
One difference and area of concern between racial and religious discrimination relates to 
definition. Although race is a contentious concept, it can be identified through tangible 




 Mandla v Dowell Lee [1982] UKHL 7. 
36
 R (Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls' High School & Anor [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin). 
37




characteristics; (physical similarities, particularly colour, or geographic or cultural 
origins) for the purposes of s 9 Equality Act 2010. This is not so in relation to religion.  
The definition of provided under the Equality Act 2010, which defines religion and belief 
on the basis that religion or ‘a lack of religion’ is a separate category from belief which 
may be ‘any religious or philosophical belief’, is far from clear.38  The case law has 
struggled to interpret this definition and this has led to a number of inconsistent decisions 
at Employment Tribunal level.  While the adoption of a generally broad understanding of 
‘religion or belief’ for discrimination law purposes follows the general trend of the 
European Court of Human Rights, it is regrettable that there has not been full 
harmonisation between these bodies of case law. The European Court has not limited 
‘belief’ to philosophical beliefs but has understood belief to require a worldview and has 
clarified that political beliefs do fall within the definition. Some beliefs may be 
discounted by a court or tribunal as lacking the coherence and seriousness that are 
required for legal recognition.  However, there needs to be greater consistency and clarity 
as to where the line is to be drawn.  
More general concerns may be raised by Section 26 of the Equality Act 2010, which 
prohibits harassment. Harassment includes creating an ‘offensive’ environment, as 
perceived by the person claiming that he or she has been harassed.  This provision can 
have a chilling effect as a significant fetter on freedom of speech, for example by 
religious evangelists.  
5. What recommendations relating to the law should the Commission on Religion 
and Belief in British Public Life make in its final report? 
In relation to the areas of concern we noted in relation to question 1, we would welcome 
clarity on the following issues: 
 The extent to which ‘ideas of Britishness’ are in fact universal and are common to 
the laws of the States of Europe as a whole;  
 
 The extent to which ‘ideas of Britishness’ can be found in the religious laws, 
norms and rules of religious groups themselves;  
 
 The continuing influence of older law on religion and whether older provisions 
need revisiting because they are based upon different assumptions;  
 








 The extent to which religious groups should and will be subject to the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (i.e. subject internally to human rights standards).  
 
 The proper interpretation of the right to religious freedom by domestic courts 
following recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.
 39
    
 
 The interaction between discrimination law and the protections afforded under the 
human rights law.  
 
 The definition of ‘religion or belief’ for discrimination law purposes and the 
definition of ‘advancement of religion’ for charity law purposes, including the 
desirability of harmonisation.  
 
 The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination, including the need for 
clarity.  
 
 The ambit and reach of exceptions afforded to religious groups, including the 
desirability for clarity and harmonisation.  
 
 The role and function of the Charity Commission and in particular the application 
of the ‘public benefit’ test. 
 
 The ambit, reach and effectiveness of criminal offences concerning religion.  
 
 The compatibility of laws on religious worship and education in schools against 
human rights standards in terms of religious freedom. 
 
 The role, function and monitoring of SACREs. 
 
 The clarity and effectiveness of the legal framework relating to schools which 
have a religious character, especially as to admissions. 
 
 The clarity of the law relating to the religious upbringing of children including the 
respective rights of parents and children as to religious belief, particularly the 
rights of children themselves to hold beliefs of their own. 
 








 The clarity of law relating to marriage and divorce, especially in light of the 
number of ‘religious’ marriages within the Islamic community that are not 
registered under civil law.  
 
  Concerns as to the operation of religious courts and tribunals, with particular 
focus on the issue of consent.  
 
These need not be achieved by legislation. Education is of importance as is dialogue 
between religious and other groups.   One way to proceed would be to develop a Charter 
or Concordat with such groups with the aim of producing a statement of common values, 
common benefits and common problems. This Charter would describe what groups and 
State agencies agreed, agreed to differ and disagreed over. The Interfaith Legal Advisers 
Network (ILAN), which is coordinated by the Centre for Law and Religion to provide a 
discussion for representatives of different legal traditions to share common experiences 
and problems, would be a suitable forum for the development of such charter/concordat.  
One general option which requires further thought is the concept of reasonable 
accommodation of religious belief, which was recognised in Eweida
40
 and, extra-
judicially, has been persuasively promoted by Baroness Hale DPSC.
41
  Although 
elements of reasonable accommodation can already be found in the question of 
justification found in Article 9(2) ECHR and in the law on indirect discrimination, the 
controversies raised by the cases to date suggest that it may be timely to draw upon the 
concept more explicitly as a key tool for achieving a better balance between rights in 
different beliefs and between beliefs and other rights. Not providing for accommodation 
could itself be regarded as a form of discrimination and as the imposition of a contrary 
ideological view. There is scope for clearer guidance on what accommodation should 
mean in practice. In particular, thought needs to be given to whether beliefs which 
emanate from the settled world view of a major religion may be entitled to more respect 
and whether there is general right to conscientious objection is required.  Conflicts seem 
particularly likely where a person with strong religious or philosophical beliefs is 
required to affirm someone else’s belief to which he or she has a conscientious objection. 









 – the first three of which were the subject of conjoined 
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appeals to the European Court of Human Rights along with Eweida.  For the purposes of 
harassment under S 26 of the Equality Act, consideration could be given to providing that 
“the other circumstances of the case” should particularly include whether the alleged 
harassment consisted in reasonable expression of sincerely-held views. 
Much of the problem in all these circumstances is that cases of this kind are highly fact-
sensitive.  Generally the case law to date shows that more often than not the law appears 
to favour the commercial interests of employers rather than the beliefs of employees. This 
is particularly relevant where employees seek time off work for religious festivals or 
regular weekly worship. Although some recent decisions suggest a partial move towards 
recognising this some recognition of this issue, it merits more general reconsideration.  
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